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Coercive measures (coercive actions) are procedural actions ensuring the successful 
execution of criminal proceedings, conducted against the will of the concerned person 
and violating or restricting certain civil rights. The coercive measures are executed by 
the authorities participating in the criminal proceedings in the interest of the criminal 
proceeding, primarily against the defendant.
1
 
An evergreen dilemma is whether the rule-of-law state can undertake during the 
investigation and proving of serious crimes to set aside certain principles, or even to 
violate fundamental human rights in the interest of reaching a ‘higher’ aim, which we 
might call, for example, a world against terrorism,
2
 but we can also think about other types 
of crimes shocking the public opinion.
3
 
According to Erika Róth: “one of the ‘ultimate cases’, when human rights can be 
restricted – although with the provision of proper guarantees –, is the criminal proceeding 
itself. In this field there are two interests conflicting: the interest of the state to enforce its 
criminal law claims with the interest of the individual to enforce his or her human rights.”
4
 
To ensure human rights “the state undertakes obligations in international conventions and 
in its Constitution, while the former one is also its obligation; since private revenge had 
been taken over by the so called collective law enforcement, the institution providing this 
task – for a very long time in history it being the state – not only has this as its rights, but it 
is also its obligation to enforce criminal law claims.”
5
 
It follows from this that the criminal proceeding can restrict human rights within the 
frame of law, but it has to be taken into account, that restriction should only be as it’s strictly 
necessary, thus the requirement of proportionality has to be fulfilled in this case as well.
6
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Coercive measures can be applied in the cases and ways defined by law (conditions 
of application are regulated by the CPA): the 4 requirements of legality are (1) the 
authority applying it, (2) the decision ordering it, (3) the ordered time period, and (4) 
the execution. During their execution the human rights of the concerned person shall be 
respected [CPA Section 60 (1)] and the principle of proportionality (gradualism) – the 
latter one concerns substitutability and necessity: coercive measures should only be 
applied until when and to the extent which it is justified. The concerned person shall be 
humanely treated during the proceedings.
7
 
The Constitutional Court has examined in several of its resolutions the constitutionality 
of coercive measures concerning personal freedom. In Decision No. 5/1999 it described the 
essential characteristics of constitutional restriction of personal freedom, which is a 
fundamental right: only under law, only by the decision of an independent court, within the 
frame of necessity and proportionality. 
The Hungarian Criminal Procedure Act [Act XIX of 1998 about criminal proceedings 
–hereinafter CPA] regulates custody as the first legal institution among coercive measures. 
Taking the defendant into custody means a temporary deprivation of the defendant of his 
freedom [CPA Section 126 (1)]. Its general case: may be ordered upon a reasonable 
suspicion that the defendant has committed a criminal offence subject to imprisonment – 
thus, in particular, if the defendant is caught in the act – provided that a probable cause 
exists to believe that the pre-trial detention of the defendant is to follow. 
All criminal authorities are entitled to order it, with the rule that if it is ordered by the 
investigating authorities they are obliged to inform the prosecutor about it within twenty-four 
hours. Generally taking into custody occurs during the investigation, but it can also be executed 
as an urgent investigative action, if the delay entails danger. Formal decision orders it, which 
contains the starting date of custody: with the indication of the day, hour and minute.  
Custody shall not exceed seventy-two hours. After the lapse of this period, the 
defendant shall be released, unless the court has ordered his pre-trial detention. Into the 
maximum seventy-two hours’ duration the time of previous detention by the authorities 
and the time of apprehension, bringing to court shall be counted; and all commenced 
hour counts as full. There’s no possibility to prolong it. Within the available seventy-
two hours the prosecutor examines whether the special conditions of pre-trial detention 
exist and if yes, then it motions for its ordering. The decision on ordering pre-trial 
detention falls under the competence of the court. 
Execution of the custody occurs in a police detention room. The person taken into 
custody shall be interrogated within twenty-four hours and access to his or her lawyer 
shall be provided. During the execution of coercive measures the requirement of humane 
treatment appears in the requirement of notice (a relative or other person indicated by the 
defendant shall be notified by the authorities about the measure and the place of 
detention); as well as in the duty to act (the authorities must provide for the care of 
children of minor age of the defendant remaining without supervision, or any other person 
being looked after by the defendant; as well as it is the obligation of the authorities to 
secure the property and home of the defendant left unattended, if it’s necessary). 
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Termination of the custody may be ordered by any of the authorities (investigating 
authority, the prosecutor or the court.) Cases of termination: (1) if the cause of its order 
ceases to exist; (2) the passing of the time of seventy-two hours; (3) immediately before 
the passing of the seventy-two hours, if the court has not ordered pre-trial detention, 
even though it was motioned for by the prosecutor. 
Against the decision ordering custody legal remedy may be initiated, however it does 
not have suspensory effect. 
Act LXXXIX of 2011 on the amendment of certain acts concerning procedural law 
and the justice system modified Section 555/G of the CPA
8
 so as to provide separate 
rules for the time period of custody in the cases of prominent significance.
9
 In 
accordance with the amendment in the cases of prominent significance custody can last 
much longer than seventy-two hours, it can be even as much as one hundred and twenty 
hours. Besides this, the amendment concerned the possibilities of contact between the 
defendant and his or her defence counsel,
10
 since it made it possible that contact 
between the defendant and the defence counsel during the first forty-eight hours of 
custody could be prohibited by the prosecutor based on the unique circumstances of the 
specific case. As the justification of this modification the legislator cited the aim of 
efficiency and processing the case within reasonable time. 
The special provisions on taking into custody and the interrogation of the suspect were 
constitutionally problematic in several regards. First of all the possibility of the prohibition 
of contacting the defence counsel violates the fundamental right to defence: the defendant 
is entitled to the right to defence in every segment of the criminal proceedings.
11
 (The 
Constitutional Court has expressed in several of its decisions that the right to defence can 
only be restricted if it is indispensably required and only to the proportionate extent, while 
its material content cannot be restricted at all.
12
) Furthermore, Article 6, paragraph 3 (b) of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) declares that everyone charged with 
a criminal offence has the right to “to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation 
of his defence”, and point c) of paragraph 3, Article 6 defines the right of the suspect “to 
defend himself in person or through legal assistance”. 
Nevertheless, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) allows 
certain derogations from Articles 3, 4 (paras.1-3), as well as Articles 5 and 6 in a 
restricted manner to the commencing part of the criminal proceedings. The Strasbourg 
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Court stated that – even though the right of the accused person to effective defence by a 
lawyer is not absolute – any exception from the practice of this right shall be clearly 
defined and strictly restricted in time, furthermore with respect to the whole procedure 
the accused cannot be deprived of his right to fair trial.
13
 The 2011 amendment of the 
Hungarian Criminal Procedure Act did not provide any constitutional justification for 
such restriction of the right to defence of the defendant.
14
 
As a result, the Constitutional Court declared with respect to the 2011 amendment
15
 
that the second sentence of Section 554/G is unconstitutional since it fully renders the 
right to defence into the discretionary power of the prosecutor, the decision restricts the 
fundamental right to defence and the exclusion of the right to remedy against the 
decision prejudices the material content of the right to defence. Thus it annulled the 
mentioned provision. The Constitutional Court cited the case-law of the European Court 
of Human Rights in its decision and highlighted the extremely important Strasbourg 
decision delivered in the Salduz-case
16
. In that case the Court found that “in order for 
the right to a fair trial to remain sufficiently ‘practical and effective’, Article 6 § 1 
requires that, as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as from the first 
interrogation of a suspect by the police, unless it is demonstrated in the light of the 
particular circumstances of each case that there are compelling reasons to restrict this 
right. Even where compelling reasons may exceptionally justify denial of access to a 
lawyer, such restriction – whatever its justification – must not unduly prejudice the 
rights of the accused under Article 6. The rights of the defence will in principle be 
irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made during police interrogation 
without access to a lawyer are used for a conviction.” Furthermore: “Early access to a 
lawyer is part of the procedural safeguards to which the Court will have particular regard 
when examining whether a procedure has extinguished the very essence of the privilege 
against self-incrimination.” The Constitutional Court also summarized the relevant 
statements of the Sebalj v. Croatia
17
 judgement: with regard to paragraph 3 (c) of Article 6 
of the ECHR it is already problematic, if the defence counsel is not present during the first 
interrogation, but the question of the violation of the Convention can only be decided after 
the examination of all the circumstances of the concrete proceedings. During which it is of 
determinant significance what the subsequent fate of the statements made without the 
lawyer is, whether the defendant later confirmed or withdrew them, and what effect did 
the statements have to the outcome of the criminal proceedings. It is also of importance 
whether other procedural actions were conducted in the absence of the defence counsel, 
and it is not irrelevant whether the defendant evaluates the characteristics of certain parts 
of the criminal proceedings as a layman or as a lawyer. 
However, the list of these cited court decisions is not comprehensive. It is important to 
highlight here the Murray v. the United Kingdom judgement, in which the Court accepted 
the position that it is in contravention of the Convention if the defendant is not allowed to 
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have access to a lawyer in the first forty-eight hours of custody.
18
 In the Lanz v. Austria case 
the Court stated that: “If a lawyer were unable to confer with his client and receive confidential 
instructions from him without surveillance, his assistance would lose much of its usefulness, 
whereas the Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are practical and effective.”
19
 
The other constitutional problem in relation to the 2011 amendment of the Hungarian 
Criminal Procedure Act is that the prolongation of the duration of custody was not in 
harmony either with Section IV (3) of the Fundamental Law, or with Article 5 (3) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, according to which everyone arrested or detained 
“shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise 
judicial power.” Thus the constitutionally guaranteed human right of the person brought under 
the criminal proceeding was violated by not providing for him the judicial decision about the 
maintenance of the restriction of his personal freedom or about placing him at liberty. 
The Strasbourg Court has not defined exactly to the day and hour the maximum length 
of keeping one detained without judicial decision which still does not breach the requirement 
of promptness. Nevertheless, in the Brogan v. the United Kingdom case
20
 the Court declared 
the four-day-and-6-hour (102 hours) long detainment without judicial decision to be in 
contravention of the Convention, notwithstanding that in that case the applicants’ custody 
took place in the frame of an investigation based on the suspicion of terrorism (thus a more 
serious crime than the ones listed above). Subsequently the Strasbourg Court expressed in 
the McKay-case
21
 that custody without judicial decision which is longer than four days, that 
is 96 hours, cannot even be accepted in cases related to terrorism. Furthermore, the Court 
highlighted that the strict time constraint imposed by the requirement of promptness leaves 
little flexibility in interpretation.
22
 The Court declared in the Schwabe and M.G. v. Germany 
case that the duration of custody for five and a half days – for the violation of the freedom of 
assembly – is unjustified.
23
 Based on all the above-mentioned it can be concluded that the 
limit is approximately 3–4 days, in which case the Court would refrain from finding 
violation of the Convention.
24
 
In accordance with the international requirements and the case-law of the Court the 
Constitutional Court declared in its Decision No. 166/2011. (XII. 20.)
25
 that the provision 
prescribing the duration of custody in one hundred and twenty hours is not in harmony with 
the requirements posed either by the ECHR, or by the case-law of the ECtHR, as well as it 
does not comply with Section 55 (2) of the Constitution. Furthermore, since the extremely 
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long custody was solely and fully based upon the decision of the prosecutor, no guarantee or 
safeguard was secured against its ordering. Taking into account all the above, the 
Constitutional Court declared the legal institution of one-hundred-and-twenty-hour long 
custody unconstitutional and expressed the obvious extension of the meaning of promptness 
to be unacceptable. 
Since the freedom of the defendant is taken away without judicial decision, also foreign 
laws allow for custody only up to a short time period, defined in hours. In accordance with 
the above-mentioned and based on the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights the 
length of custody cannot exceed 96 hours, since this can be regarded as the upper limit of the 
arraignment of the defendant, in which case the violation of the Convention cannot be 
declared.
26
 For example, in England and Wales custody can last for 24 hours, which can be 
prolonged up to the maximum of 36 hours. It is also a general rule in France that the 




As a summary, it can be stated that the restriction of the rights of the defendant in 
order to increase the efficiency of the criminal proceedings cannot entail the violation of 
basic human rights. The unconditional safeguarding of the right to defence and the 
application of the test of necessity and proportionality in relation to the restriction of 










A kényszerintézkedések a büntetőeljárás eredményes lefolytatását biztosító eljárási 
cselekmények, melyeket az érintett személy akarata ellenére foganatosítanak és 
bizonyos állampolgári jogokat sértenek vagy korlátoznak. A kényszercselekményeket 
bűnügyekben eljáró hatóságok foganatosítják a büntetőeljárás célja érdekében, elsősorban a 
terhelttel szemben. 
A tanulmány az egyik leggyakrabban foganatosított és a személyi szabadság elvonásával 
járó kényszerintézkedés, az őrizetbe vétel lehetséges időtartamáról szól, a folyamatban 
lévő Büntetőeljárási törvény kodifikációja során jelentkező kérdések felvázolásával. 
Vizsgálja a személyi szabadság elvonásával járó kényszerintézkedések alkotmányosságának 
problematikáját csakúgy, mint a nemzetközi dokumentumokban lefektetett kötelezettségeket 
a személyi szabadság büntetőeljárásban történő elvonása során.  
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